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Everyday Settings 
A highly experienced airline crew carefully performs the procedures required to 
ready the aircraft for takeoff while taxiing to the runway, but discovers a mechanical 
problem and taxies back to the ramp to get it fixed. When the problem is fixed, the crew 
taxies back to the runway and takes off. The aircraft climbs only a few feet into the air 
before the crew loses control and crashes; everyone on board dies. The accident 
investigation team discovers that the wing flaps had been set to the takeoff position the 
first time the aircraft taxied out but not the second time. The takeoff configuration 
warning system, which normally alerts pilots of incorrect settings, failed on this occasion. 
A technician is preparing an IV bag with several pharmaceutical ingredients. Just 
as he is about to reach in a drawer for a vial with the last ingredient, sodium chloride, he 
is interrupted by another technician's call for assistance on another task. Returning to the 
IV task a few minutes later he forgets to add the sodium chloride. The IV is administered 
to a patient who develops severe hyponatremia because of the lack of sodium. The 
problem is detected and corrected several hours later, but the patient's hospitalization is 
prolonged because of the error. 
A university professor decides to drive to a store for milk on a Sunday. On the 
drive her mind wanders and she discovers herself arriving at the university. She decides 
to take advantage of being at work to pick up some papers from her office and get the 
milk on the way home. \Vhen she gets home her husband asks, where's the milk, and she 
realizes she again forgot to go by the store. 
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A father agrees to drop his infant at day care on the way to work, normally his 
wife's task. Recent safety legislation requires that infant carriers be strapped in a rear seat 
for greater safety in case of collision. The infant falls asleep, and the father is 
preoccupied with heavy traffic. Forgetting to swing by the day care center, he follows his 
habitual route directly to work and goes inside, forgetting the child sleeping quietly in the 
back seat. 
What these examples, based on actual events, have in common is forgetting to 
perform an intended task, typically a task that is not especially difficult or complex, 
though it may be extremely important, and the person involved may be quite 
conscientious. Remembering-and too often forgetting- to perform a task whose 
execution must be delayed involves prospective memory. Typically the period between 
forming a delayed intention and the opportunity to execute it is filled with ongoing tasks 
unrelated to the intention, which is not held in awareness during this period and must be 
retrieved from memory. 
A crucial aspect of prospective memory distinguishing it from most other forms 
of memory is that no external agent explicitly informs the individual when it is time to 
stop performing the ongoing task and to retrieve the stored intention from memory-he 
or she must "remember to remember". The individual is not overtly in retrieval mode, 
deliberately attempting to retrieve the stored intention. Thus, two of the most central 
questions of prospective memory research are what cognitive processes work to retrieve 
deferred intentions at the appropriate time and why they sometimes fail. 
Although human memory has been studied extensively for well over a century, 
only a few papers on prospective memory appeared before 1990, and most of these were 
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about studies conducted under naturalistic conditions with limited experimental 
manipulation and control. For example, participants might be asked to remind the 
experimenter to make a telephone call at the end of the experiment-the challenge being 
for the participant to remember to perform this delayed task (Harris, 1984) without 
prompting. However, in 1990, Einstein and McDaniel developed a paradigm (described 
later) that allowed a wide range of experimental manipulations, as well as repeated 
measures, and their initial studies stimulated new interest in this topic by many 
researchers. 
By 2006, more than 360 prospective memory papers appeared in the research 
literature, and the number of citations of these studies is growing rapidly (Marsh, Cook, 
& Hicks, 2006). International conferences devoted to prospective memory research were 
held in 2000 and 2005, and another conference is planned for 2010. However, even 
though prospective remembering is centrally involved in many everyday and workplace 
tasks, a recent search of the journal Human Factors for papers with the term prospective 
memory or prospective remembering yielded only one paper from 1983 that focused on 
prospective memory (Wichman & Oyasato) and another paper from 1998 that used 
prospective memory as one of several dependent variables in a study of sleep deprivation 
(Hockey, Wastell, & Sauer). Six other papers mentioned prospective memory in 
discussion sections and various other papers reported studies of topics, such as 
medication adherence, in which prospective memory undoubtedly plays a role (e.g., Park, 
Morrell, Frieske, Blackburn, & Birchmore, 1991). Given that prospective memory 
failures have contributed to many serious accidents in industry and in everyday life 
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(Dismukes, 2008; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007), this topic deserves the attention of the 
human factors community. 
In this review, oriented to the human factors community, I will summarize and 
provide a perspective on recent research and theory on prospective memory. This will not 
be an exhaustive review of literature, which is already available in two excellent recent 
books that provide a wealth of detail on the current state of experimental research 
(Kliegel, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2008; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007; also see 
Brandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel, 1996, for a still relevant overview of the field as it 
was emerging). Rather, I will explore the limits of existing experimental paradigms and 
theory, which, in my opinion, fail to capture some critical aspects of performance outside 
the laboratory. I will also review the relatively few studies in workplace and everyday 
settings and will discuss several studies that attempt to bridge between the bulk of 
experimental studies and these few naturalistic studies. Finally, I will describe 
countermeasures that can reduce vulnerability to forgetting to perform intended tasks, and 
I will propose a research agenda that would extend existing experimental and theoretical 
approaches and would support human factors practitioners by generating information on 
a wide range of issues relevant to prospective memory performance in natural settings I. 
The term prospective memory is a bit misleading; cognitive processes beyond 
memory are also involved in remembering to perform deferred tasks-for example, goal 
setting, planning, task management, and attention all play important roles, as will be 
discussed. Thus, prospective memory is not a unitary cognitive process, but rather is 
1 I use the terms "natural" and "real-world" interchangeably to refer to workplace and 
daily life settings and to the diverse tasks people perform in those settings. Some critics 
might argue that human-created settings are not "natural", but the alternative term, "real-
world", is also sometimes criticized. 
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defined by the nature of the task offorming an intention to perform an action at a later 
time and remembering to perform the intended action at the appropriate time without 
being explicitly prompted to do so. 
Prospective memory shares some aspects of the broad topic of goals, but with a 
different focus (Gollwitzer & Cohen, 2008). Both involve intentionality, determination to 
bring about some future state. However the focus of one's goals is the outcome state, 
which may be pursued by various means over time, whereas prospective memory 
revolves around the intention to perform a specific action. Such intentions are ubiquitous 
in daily life-at the moment a writing pad on my desk lists more than a dozen actions I 
wish to remember to accomplish in the near future. 
We notice prospective memory mainly when it fails. The content of intentions, 
what we intend to do, called the retrospective component, is usually simple (e.g., pick up 
milk on the way home from work), and the most common failure of prospective memory 
is the failure to remember to act on the intention at the intended time, place, or condition. 
Less frequently, individuals will realize they intend to do something but cannot retrieve 
from memory what they intended to do--for example, going into a room to perform some 
task and failing to remember what the task is. (Little empirical research has addressed 
forgetting of the content of intentions, presumably because retrospective memory has 
been studied extensively in the larger literature on memory.) Another way in which the 
retrospective component sometimes fails is when individuals forget whether they have 
recently performed a periodic intention such as taking medication. (See Marsh, Hicks, 
Cook, & Mayhorn, 2007, for a rare experimental study of this phenomenon.) 
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Varieties of Prospective Memory 
The primary distinction made in the research literature is between event-based 
intentions, which are to be performed when a specific situation occurs-for example, an 
intention to give a message to a friend the next time you see her-and time-based 
intentions, which are to be performed at a specific time-for example, an intention to 
take cookies out of the oven in 20 minutes. The vast majority of experimental research so 
far has been directed to event-based prospective memory, with a modest number of 
studies exploring time-based prospective memory. 
Further distinctions within both event-based and time-based prospective memory 
have sometimes been made. For example, Kvavilashvili and Ellis (1996) distinguished 
intentions to be executed when an individual is at a particular location from those to be 
executed when performing a particular activity, and Ellis (1996) divided time-based 
prospective intentions into two types: pulse, to be executed at a specific time, and step, to 
be executed during a broader time window. Meacham and Leiman (1976) distinguished 
habitual remembering of routinely performed intentions, such as brushing one's teeth at a 
particular time, from episodic remembering of infrequent tasks, such as getting milk on 
the way home from work, for which one must form a separate intention for each episode. 
(Episodic tasks can be either event-based or time-based.) In addition to episodic and 
habitual intentions, Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi (2009) identified two other 
situations in which individuals (specifically, pilots) must remember to perform intended 
actions: remembering to resume an interrupted task and remembering to switch attention 
between concurrent tasks. 
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K vavilashviIi and Ellis (1996) argue that not all failures to carry out an intention 
are errors of prospective memory. In their view, only situations in which an explicit, 
episodic intention is formed for a delayed task should be considered prospective memory. 
Thus, apparently, they would exclude most habitual tasks, failures to s\\itch attention 
between concurrent tasks, and interrupted tasks that are not resumed. They would also 
exclude situations in which individuals absent-mindedly substitute a habitual action for 
an intended one, for example, going into the bathroom looking for missing eyeglasses 
and instead brushing one's teeth. 
The distinctions K vavilashvili and Ellis make are important for understanding 
why people forget to do what they intend, but I prefer to group all these phenomena 
under the umbrella of prospective memory. When people inadvertently fail to perform an 
intended action in these diverse situations, they think of themselves as having forgotten. 
Further, these diverse situations share some common features. The important thing, 
especially for the human factors community, is not to worry too much about semantics 
but to understand the diverse phenomena involved in forgetting to perform intended 
actions in prototypical situations so that we can develop countermeasures to reduce 
vulnerability to these errors. 
Event-based prospective memory 
In 1990, Einstein and McDaniel published a prospective memory study using a 
laboratory paradigm that stimulated research worldwide. In this paradigm, participants 
are given instructions for an ongoing task such as rating the pleasantness of a series of 
words appearing on a computer screen. They are also given an additional task involving 
prospective memory; for example, whenever they encounter a particular word (e.g., dog) 
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during the ongoing task they are to perform an additional action, such as pressing a 
special key. (In some cases the additional action is to be made in response to any word of 
a particular category, such as "animal".) Typically the retention interval between 
instructions and encountering a prospective memory target word is around 5-10 minutes, 
and spacing of prospective memory trials within an experiment ranges from less than a 
minute to several minutes. (The relation of the paradigm's features to the range of 
prospective memory conditions in real-world situations will be discussed later.) When 
questioned after the experiment, participants have little difficulty recalling the 
prospective response they were supposed to make and the condition for making that 
response, even though they forget to make the response on some or many trials. 
Although it may seem surprising that participants would forget to perform such a 
simple deferred task, this parallels everyday experience, and error rates in this paradigm 
are high enough to allow systematic manipulation. Using variations on the Einstein-
McDaniel paradigm, scientists have elucidated many aspects of the cognitive processes of 
encoding, retention, and retrieval underlying prospective memory. Since a central 
concern in prospective memory is failure to retrieve and act on intentions, I will start with 
studies of retrieval. 
Retrieval 
Prospective memory performance is greatly affected by the relation of the target 
cue (that signals the opportunity to execute the deferred intention) to the content of the 
intention stored in memory. Cues that are strongly associated with the intention are more 
effective in eliciting retrieval (McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & Breneiser. 2004; Loft & 
Yeo, 2007). This is illustrated by studies in which the prospective response is to say a 
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particular word when the target cue occurs in the ongoing task. For example, if the target 
cue is the word church. performance is much better when the intended prospective 
response is to say "steeple" than when the response is "sauce". Apparently the strong pre-
existing association between church and steeple increases the amount of activation2 that 
spreads from the encountered target cue to the associated response stored in memory, 
facilitating retrieval. 
Cues that are distinctive, salient, or unusual produce better prospective 
remembering than cues that are less so (Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 1994; Einstein, 
McDaniel, Manzi, Cochran, & Baker, 2000; Uttl, 2005). One example is target words 
printed in all capitalized letters occurring in a series of uncapitalized words; another 
example is target words seldom encountered, such as monad. The features of such targets 
are assumed to attract attention and thus elicit more extensive processing, which provides 
additional activation to items associated in memory. For example, the word appearing in 
capitalized letters might cause the participant to pause to wonder why it is different from 
the other words in the ongoing task. Also, unusual words have fewer pre-existing 
associations in memory to dilute the activation of the association to the deferred 
intention. 
The way in which the ongoing task causes potential target cucs to be processed 
greatly atfects prospective remembering. For example, participants might be given the 
ongoing task of naming famous people viewed in a series of photographs and an 
additional task of pressing a certain key when the name John is identified (in one 
2 Activation is a cognitive psychology concept used to characterize the level of 
accessibility of items stored in memory. More highly activated items are more readily 
accessible and can be retrieved more quickly 
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condition) or pressing the key when a man with a pipe is identified (in another condition) 
(Maylor, 1993). Performance is better in the first condition, presumably because the 
ongoing task causes the participant to focus explicitly on the aspect of the target directly 
related to how the prospective task is framed in memory. In this condition the prospective 
memory target cue is said to be focal to the ongoing task. In the second condition the 
ongoing task does not require the participant to think about whether the persons in the 
photographs have pipes, thus this target cue is said to be non-focal. 
In addition to the target cue itself, the context of the ongoing task may support 
retrieval of intended actions (Cook, Marsh, & Hicks, 2004; Nowinski & Dismukes, 
2005). Participants better remember to perform delayed tasks when the target cue is 
encountered in the context of an ongoing task associated with the delayed intention 
during encoding than when the target is encountered in a different context. Thus, an 
individual would be more likely to remember an intention to give a work-related message 
to a colleague when the colleague is encountered at work than when the colleague is 
encountered at a grocery store. 
Prospective remembering suffers when the cognitive demands of the ongoing task 
are high. Dividing attention between two ongoing tasks (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007, 
p.63) or increasing the rate of ongoing task demands (Stone, Dismukes & Remington, 
2001) typically impairs prospective memory. Marsh and Hicks (1998) cleverly 
demonstrated that this impairment occurs when ongoing tasks make high demands on the 
executive component of working memory but not when the demands are on the other two 
components, the visual-spatial sketchpad and the phonological loop. An important 
exception to the typical results with highly demanding ongoing tasks occurs when the 
11 
Remembrance of Things Future 
12 
target cue is highly salient (Einstein, McDaniel, Manzi, Cochran, & Baker, 2000) or 
highly associated with the prospective response (McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & 
Breneiser, 2004). In these two situations prospective remembering is not impaired even 
when the ongoing task places severe demands on executive processes. 
Competing theoretical accounts of retrieval. We must examine theoretical issues, 
both to make sense of experimental findings and because competing theories have 
diverging implications for practical issues. Currently, the most contentious theoretical 
issue in prospective memory research concerns how delayed intentions are retrieved into 
awareness. One theoretical perspective (Guynn, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001; McDaniel, 
Robinson-Riegler, & Einstein, 1998; Dismukes & Nowinski, 2006) argues that the 
process is automatic--encountering target cues triggers retrieval of intentions through a 
reflexive associative process that requires few, if any, limited cognitive resources 
(working memory and attention). When the target cue is encountered, its association in 
memory with the deferred intention provides sufficient activation for the intention to 
either be retrieved directly into memory or for the participant to recognize that something 
is special about this cue, triggering a directed search of memory. This view is consistent 
with the everyday experience of having intentions pop back into awareness v.ithout 
conscious effort. It is also consistent v.ith Reese and Cherry's (2002) finding that 
participants probed during ongoing tasks reported rarely thinking about the prospective 
task while performing an ongoing task and that infrequent thoughts about the prospective 
task were not correlated with prospective memory performance. 
Several lines of experimental evidence support the automatic association view, 
including the previously cited studies showing that divided attention does not impair 
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prospective remembering when target cues are distinctive or highly associated with the 
intended action. Other studies have shown that intentions are activated even when 
encountering target cues in situations in which participants do not intend to respond, 
suggesting an automatic, or spontaneous response (Einstein, McDaniel, Mayfield, Shank, 
Morrisette, & Breneiser, 2005; Holbrook, Nowinski & Dismukes, 2005). Also, in diary 
studies (Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007) and in naturalistic studies (Sellen, Louie, Harris & 
Wilkins, 1997) participants report thoughts of delayed intentions coming into mind 
during periods of low activity long before the time when the intention is to be executed. 
In direct contrast to the automatic association perspective, Smith and her 
colleagues argue that retrieval of delayed intentions always requires limited cognitive 
resources (Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004; Smith, Hunt, McVay, & McConnell, 
2007). They designed an ingenious paradigm to test this hypothesis. Participants are 
given the ongoing task of performing lexical decisions on a series of short letter-strings 
presented on a computer screen: Is the target letter-string a word or not? (Called the 
lexical decision task, LOT.) The prospective task is to make a separate response to certain 
words, but the crucial measure is whether having this prospective task slows responding 
to the lexical decision task on trials in which the prospective target does not occur. 
Slowing on these trials is taken to indicate that being prepared to perform the prospective 
task requires limited cognitive resources in competition with the ongoing task, which is 
what Smith and her colleagues found. They developed a formal mathematical model-
Preparatory and Attentional Memory Process (P AM)-asserting that individuals must 
maintain a preparatory attentional state to detect and evaluate potential cues indicating 
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opportunities to execute delayed intentions. Intentions cannot be retrieved when this 
preparatory state is not operating. 
Smith and colleagues provide convincing evidence that being prepared to execute 
a delayed intention taxes limited cognitive resources in their paradigm. The unresolved 
issue is whether successful execution of delayed intentions always requires limited 
resources, especially in real-world situations. McDaniel and Einstein (2000) proposed a 
multiprocess theory, combining aspects of the automatic association view and the view 
that prospective remembering draws upon limited resources (which they term strategic 
monitoring). They assert that in some situations individuals rely on automatic retrieval 
processes but in others devote resources to strategic monitoring to improve performance. 
(One can argue that automatic associative processes are always in operation, but 
individuals may voluntarily supplement those processes.) 
Consistent with the multiprocess theory, studies have shown that participants 
allocate more or fewer resources (as measured by cost to speed of lexical decision-
making) to prospective remembering as a function of the relative importance of the 
prospective memory and ongoing tasks (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 200 I, 
2004). When instructions to participants emphasized the importance of the prospective 
task, lexical decisions slowed, suggesting some resources were shifted to that task. 
However, emphasis of the prospective memory task improved performance only if the 
target cue was non-focal; if the cue was focal, performance did not improve, suggesting 
that in the focal condition retrieval is automatic and does not benefit from additional 
resources. Similarly, Marsh, Hicks, & Cook (2005) found that instructions to increase 
effort toward the ongoing task speeded lexical decision-making, but impaired prospective 
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memory performance only when the prospective task competed for the same cognitive 
resources as the ongoing task. 
As Marsh et al. (2005) suggest, participants' attention toward both ongoing and 
prospective tasks probably waxes and wanes over time, and this variation is undoubtedly 
much greater in real-world situations. Loft and Yeo (2007) capitalized on this natural 
variation, looking at lexical decision-making speed on trials shortly before a prospective 
target cue appeared, for indication of lapses in monitoring. On trials in which monitoring 
for prospective memory targets had apparently lapsed-as evidenced by lack of slowing 
of lexical decision-making-prospective remembering was not affected if the target cue 
was highly associated with the prospective response (e.g., the cue was mouth and the 
response was to say wash). However, if the cue and response were not highly associated 
(e.g., mouth and table), prospective remembering suffered when monitoring lapsed. This 
study suggests that monitoring for prospective cues varies naturally and contributes to 
prospective remembering in some situations but not in others. Marsh, Cook, & Hicks 
(2006) further suggest that allocation of attention between ongoing tasks and prospective 
tasks is dynamic and flexible, though the studies cited above indicate that prospective 
memory performance is correlated with attention allocation only in some situations. 
The multiprocess theory appears to reconcile secmingly contradictory 
experimental findings. One possible explanation for conflicting results with studies of 
interference with ongoing task performance (when lexical decision-making speed is the 
dependent measure) lies with differences in details of the experimental paradigm. 
Typically, slowing is observed when participants are given multiple prospective target 
cues to remember (Smith, 2003, used six), but not when only a single, specific cue is used 
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(Einstein, McDaniel, Thomas, Mayfield, Shank, Morrisette, & Breneiser, 2005; Marsh, 
Hicks, Cook, Hansen, & Pallos, 2003; Cohen, Jaudas, & Gollwitzer, 2008). Presumably, 
participants recognize that some effort will be required to maintain multiple cues in 
memory and engage in some sort of rehearsal, diverting resources from the ongoing task. 
However, Smith, Hunt, McVay and McConnell (2007) recently reported slowed lexical 
decision-making when only a single prospective target cue was used, so this issue is not 
yet settled. 
It is likely that individuals use more than one type of resource-demanding process 
to support prospective remembering, as a function of the situation. At the extreme, 
experiment participants might consciously inspect each cue in a series of trials to 
determine if it is a prospective memory target, making this something of a vigilance task. 
But this is highly unlike reaJ-world situations, in which several delayed intentions are 
often maintained for long periods and in which ongoing tasks do not occur as a series of 
trials. Smith et al. (2007) proposed that the preparatory attentional state may occur on the 
edge of awareness, outside the focus of attention, and that this preparatory state may be 
induced when individuaJs encounter situations in which an opportunity to execute a 
delayed intention may arise. Although no experimental research has yet addressed this 
supposition, it is interesting because it seems to address the problem of maintaining a 
resource-demanding preparatory state while performing various ongoing tasks for periods 
longer than typicaJly used in laboratory studies. 
Consistent with this supposition, Marsh, Hicks, & Cook (2006) found that holding 
an intention did not produce costs to an ongoing laboratory task until participants 
encountered the context in which they expected to encounter prospective memory targets. 
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But in real-world situations individuals may not anticipate the context in which they 
encounter an opportunity to execute an intention. I might intend to give a colleague a 
message when I see her at work next week but encounter her tomorrow at the grocery 
store, and I will have some chance of remembering to give her the message then. 
If one argues that the preparatory state is induced by seeing the colleague, this 
itself would seem to be an automatic process, though later stages, such as deciding 
whether the situation is appropriate to act upon the retrieved intention may well require 
limited resources (Marsh, Hicks, & Watson, 2002). Further, I suggest that cost to an 
ongoing task may not always represent operation of an attentional state, but could in 
some circumstances be a memory process consistent with automatic retrieval. In typical 
laboratory paradigms, the goal of performing the ongoing task and the goal of performing 
the prospective task are linked and are sub-goals of the super-ordinate goal of following 
all of the experimenter's instructions. Attending to the ongoing task would provide 
activation, not just to the elements of the ongoing task, but also to the associated 
prospective task. This division of activation-an example of the fan effect-would 
reduce available activation for performing ongoing task elements and slow lexical 
decision-making. Note that this effect would be automatic, and would not involve 
attention per se. If this argument is correct, we would expect the association between the 
ongoing task and the prospective task to weaken over time if no prospective trials are 
encountered, and this would reduce slowing of lexical decision-making, which is exactly 
what Loft, Kearney, & Remington (2008) found. 
It has not been established whether results with the LDT paradigm would extend 
to other types of ongoing tasks and to real-world situations. LDT is a speeded task, which 
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may affect how participants allocate resources, and more than one interpretation of LDT 
slowing is possible. For example, it might be that cognitive resources are required to be 
prepared on all trials to inhibit speeded responses to the LDT in case a prospective 
memory target appears. Currently, the preponderance of evidence supports the 
multiprocess perspective that automatic processes allow successful prospective 
remembering in some situations and that individuals supplement these processes with 
limited cognitive resources to improve performance in other situations. Clearly, however, 
much more research is needed to resolve fundamental issues and to determine practical 
implications. 
I devoted a fair amount of space here to these theoretical issues both because they 
help us understand experimental findings and because they lead us to think about 
practical implications. McDaniel and Einstein (2000, 2007) do not assert that prospective 
remembering is ever completely automatic, but rather that in some situations it is largely 
automatic and in other situations successful performance requires appreciable 
commitment oflimited resources (strategic monitoring). It seems likely that automaticity 
is not all-or-nothing but a matter of degree, especially in real-world situations. If the 
multiprocess theory is correct, one practical issue is how to enhance automatic retrieval 
of intentions at the appropriate time. Another practical issue is what real-world situations 
require some sort of monitoring or preparatory attentional state to achieve adequate 
prospective remembering. How big a role does monitoring play in various situations in 
comparison to other factors, such as cue salience and implementation planning? 
If, as Smith and her colleagues assert (2003, 2007), a preparatory attentional state 
must always be established in order for a delayed intention to be executed, it is crucial to 
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determine the nature of this preparatory state and what factors elicit and maintain it. Also, 
we need to know how costs to lexical decision-making extend to performance of diverse 
real world ongoing tasks. Could the preparatory proceesess Smith et a.l propose be 
maintained for days and weeks while a series of ongoing tasks are performed and 
multiple intentions are deferred? Typically lexical decision-making is slowed by fractions 
of a second, and, if it really is slowed when participants need to remember only a single 
specific target, the effect is quite minute. Would performance of real-world tasks be 
affected appreciably, and, if so, in what manner? And do different levels of cost (say 50 
msec versus 150 msec) imply differences in cognitive resources involved in performing 
the prospective memory task? (Practical implications of laboratory findings will be 
treated at greater length in later sections.) 
Encoding 
Consider some of the diverse ways in which we form intentions in our daily lives. 
I may determine to ask a friend for a favor whenever I next see him, or may identify a 
specific meeting time and place at which to ask. I may decide to add a footnote to this 
paper after finishing the first draft and assume that I will do this while working on the 
desktop computer in my office, even though I may end up doing my revisions on my 
laptop while traveling. You may decide to surprise you spouse with a birthday gift, an 
intention that will entail sub-ordinate goals: what kind of gift, where and when to buy it, 
how to hide it until the birthday, and so forth. You may engage in the substantial planning 
necessary to execute all aspects of this intention at the time you form it, or you may plan 
each aspect separately over time. 
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Contrast this diversity with the Einstein-McDaniel paradigm, in which intentions 
are given to participants in the form of instructions, rather than being self generated. 
Participants are told to execute a delayed intention when and only when a specified 
discrete event occurs, and typically this event occurs several times in the course of the 
experiment. In most experiments the participant performs only a single ongoing task 
(although divided attention or task switching are occasionally involved), in contrast to 
everyday situations in which individuals maintain multiple delayed intentions while 
performing diverse ongoing tasks that change dynamically. Individuals often do not know 
what task they will be performing when the opportunity to execute the delayed intention 
arrives. 
Very little experimental work has explored the diversity of intentions in everyday 
life, and the ways in which individuals plan to execute those intentions (Holbrook & 
Dismukes, in press); and, in comparison to retrieval, relatively little is known about 
encoding of intentions. An important exception comes from naturalistic studies in the 
field of social psychology (Cohen & Gollwitzer, 2008). Noting that in everyday life 
people's plans to perform delayed intentions are often quite vague about the 
circumstances under which the intentions are to be performed, social psychologists 
developed the concept and technique of implementation intentions (Golwitzer, 1999). 
Typically, the intention is a personal one in everyday life; the manipulation in these 
studies is to instruct one group of participants to determine the specific situation in which 
they will execute the delayed intention, to identifY specific cues they are likely to 
encounter at that time, and to associate those cues with the intention through rehearsal 
and/or visualization. For example, the implementation intention for individuals wanting 
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to remember to take a medication daily might be to visualize themselves taking the 
medication in the bathroom immediately after brushing their teeth in the morning. 
Forming implementation intentions has been shown to greatly improve 
prospective remembering in diverse everyday tasks such as exercising (Milne, Orbell, & 
Sheeran, 2002), breast self-examination (Orbell, Hodgkins, & Sheeran, 1997), medication 
adherence (Sheeren & Orbell, 1999; Wilson & Park, 2008), and completing homework 
assignments (Gollwitzer & Brandstatter, 1997). In some studies, implementation 
intentions improved prospective memory performance by two to four-fold. 
Implementation intentions are argued to improve performance by creating a link 
in memory between potential environmental cues and the delayed intentions, by making 
this link more accessible in memory, and by allowing environmental cues to trigger 
retrieval in an automatic fashion that makes few demands of limited cognitive resources 
(Gollwitzer, 1999; Cohen & Gollwitzer, 2008). As yet, little experimental research has 
been directed to exploring these theoretical assertions (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007, p 
117). One reason these intriguing and important naturalistic studies have received limited 
experimental investigation is that most prospective memory experimental paradigms are 
not well designed for this investigation. A sort of implementation intention is already 
built into the Einstein-McDaniel paradigm-participants are told what the ongoing task 
will be and are told to respond to a specific target cue or category of cue, thus limited 
manipulation is possible. 
Some, though not all, laboratory studies have found that elaborating standard 
prospective memory instructions in the form of implementation intentions enhances 
prospective remembering (Chasteen, Park, & Schwarz, 2001; Cohen & Gollwitzer, 2008; 
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McDaniel, Howard, & Butier, 2008). These studies suggest that implementation 
intentions improve automatic retrieval of intentions by increasing the association in 
memory between target cues and deferred intentions. However, the picture is more 
complex than this might suggest. Meeks and Marsh (in press) found that forming 
implementation intentions improved prospective remembering with category target 
instructions (e.g., respond to any animal name). With this prospective memory task, 
participants would not have been able to increase the association between the intention 
and specific target cues (e.g., dog), so the authors argue that forming implementation 
intentions in this situation must improve prospective remembering by some other 
mechanism, perhaps by increasing the importance of the prospective memory task and 
thus altering attention allocation. 
Kliegel and his colleagues have developed a sub-goal scheduling task that allows 
some aspects of intention planning to be studied experimentally (Kleigel, McDaniel, & 
Einstein, 2000; Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2002). Participants must switch 
among sub-tasks strategically to obtain a good score, and they must remember to make 
these switches at the appropriate circumstance even though engaged in a cognitively 
demanding ongoing sub-task. Consistent with the concept of implementation intentions, 
studies with this paradigm show that remembering to switch improves with the quality of 
planning (identifYing in advance specific conditions for switching) and with the degree of 
plan adherence during task execution. In addition to supporting study of implementation 
planning, this scheduling paradigm could be used to study concurrent task management, 
discussed in a later section. 
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In summary, the limited research to date on encoding of deferred intentions 
suggests that this is a topic that could support developing practical measures to improve 
prospective remembering, 
Retention 
In the interval between forming an intention and the opportunity to execute it we 
typically tum our attention to other tasks, thus the intention must be stored in memory 
and later retrieved. What is the status of the stored intention during this retention interval 
and how does its status affect the probability of retrieval? Does this status change over 
time, and if so in what way? The answers to these questions are not yet clear, but they 
will probably vary as a function of how the intention is encoded, its relation to ongoing 
tasks, cues encountered during retention that may be related to the intention, and 
strategies individuals use to remember to perform the intention. These questions are 
directly relevant to the central issue of how deferred intentions are retrieved at the 
appropriate time. Although we are all frustrated when we fail to remember to perform 
intentions, in a way it is remarkable that we do succeed so often, given that ongoing tasks 
demand our attention, and it is not practical to continuously ask ourselves "Is there 
something else I should be doing now?" 
One suggestion, originally put forward by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960), is 
that intentions have some sort of special status in memory that makes them more 
accessible, easier to retrieve than other memory items. A prominent concept in cognitive 
psychology is that memory items lie along a continuum of activation, and that 
accessibility is a function of the level of activation (Anderson, 1996). If memory for 
intentions were more highly activated than comparable memory items not associated with 
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intentionality, environmental cues might more readily trigger retrieval of intentions into 
awareness, especially when individuals rely on automatic retrieval. 
One line of experimental investigation, started by Goschke and Kuhl (1993) 
supports this suggestion. In this paradigm, as modified by Marsh, Hicks, and Bink 
(1998), activation/accessibility of the retrospective component of prospective memory is 
measured by how quickly participants can perform a lexical decision task. Participants 
memorize a pair of action scripts consisting of several phrases such as set the table, pour 
the coffee, sharpen the pencil. After memorizing, participants are told that they will be 
expected to perform one of the pair of action scripts, which becomes a prospective script, 
but not the other, which then becomes a neutral script. Participants next perform an LDT 
in which they encounter a series of words and non-words; a small subset of the words 
comes from the prospective script and another small subset comes from the neutral script. 
Studies consistently show an intentional superiority effect (ISE) in which words from the 
prospective script are responded to more quickly than words from the neutral script, 
indicating greater activation or accessibility of the script that participants intend to 
perform (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998; Marsh, Hicks, & Byran, 
1999). 
Note that, although the prospective script involves intentionality, the Goschke and 
Kuhl paradigm does not present a true prospective memory situation because participants 
expect to be told when to execute the prospective script rather than having to self-initiate 
it without prompting. However, Dockree and Ellis (2001) modified the paradigm in a 
naturalistic design in which participants did expect to have to remember to perform the 
intended actions without prompting. In this study, after being given instructions for two 
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tasks supposedly to be performed at the end of a cover experiment, participants were later 
told one of the tasks was no longer needed and they would only have to perform the other 
task. When given a LOT, participants responded more quickly to words from the task still 
to be performed than to words from the cancelled task. 
It would seem unnecessary, perhaps maladaptive, for intentions to remain in an 
activated state after they have been performed. To explore this issue, Marsh et al. (1998) 
compared LOT performance for action scripts that had recently been performed to 
performance of action scripts yet to be performed. They discovered that the intention 
superiority effect disappeared after performing an action script, and in fact was 
reversed-lexical decision making was significantly slowed (in comparison to neutral 
script words) after completion of a prospective script, suggesting that this script was now 
inhibited rather than activated. Conceivably this inhibition is a mechanism to prevent 
completed intentions from intruding into our thoughts when no longer relevant. 
Although ISE studies are quite valuable in helping us understand some aspects of 
the cognitive mechanisms that may underlie prospective memory, the limitations of these 
studies should be noted. Although it is plausible that heightened activation of the content 
of intentions supports, this has not yet been demonstrated experimentally. Also, the ISE 
has been studied only for retention intervals of no more than 30 minutes, so it is not 
known if heightened activation would persist for the much longer intervals often required 
in many everyday prospective memory tasks. 
~iary studies and naturalistic studies provide another form of insight into the 
status of prospective memory during retention. Kvavilashvili and Fisher (2007) asked 
participants to make a telephone call to the experimenters at a particular time seven days 
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later (a time-based task) or when they reeeived a certain text message (an event-based 
task, which also occurred a week later). Participants kept diaries in which they recorded 
instances in which the intention came to mind during the week. They also recorded what 
they were doing when the intention came to mind and what seemed to trigger retrieval of 
the intention. The average number of recollections per participant over the week ranged 
from about eight to about 11 in the three experiments. 
Recalling the intention was often triggered by chance encounters with 
environmental cues thematically related to the intention (e.g., seeing a telephone, diary, 
or watch). Somewhat less frequently, recall was triggered by participants stream of 
thought (e.g., thinking about other intentions), and much less frequently was recall a 
response to self-initiated planning thoughts (e.g., thinking about tasks to be performed 
that day). Strikingly, between a fourth and a half of the recollections occurred without 
any apparent trigger-the thought of calling the experimenter seemed to just pop into 
mind. K vavilashvili and Fisher interpret these results as suggesting that the representation 
of the intention remained activated at a sub-threshold level throughout the week, 
increasing the ability of chance cues to trigger retrieval. In contrast, deliberate search of 
memory for what to do next did not seem to playa major role. 
K vavilashvili and Fisher also found that intention retrieval during the week was 
more likely to occur when participants were engaged in relatively automatic tasks making 
low demands on attention. Also, in contrast to laboratory studies cited previously, an 
importance manipulation had no effect on retrievals during the week or on prospective 
memory performance, highlighting the need for caution in extrapolating from laboratory 
studies to diverse real-world tasks. 
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Sellen, Louie, Harris, and Wilkins (1997) reported an ingenious study of 
retention-period recall in which participants performed an event-based prospective task 
and a time-based task in their own office workplace, using identity badges already in use 
that recorded the location of the participant whenever a button on the badge was pressed. 
In the event-based task, participants were told to press the button three times whenever 
they entered the "commons", a shared work area, and to press the button once any time 
they thought of this intention any time during the week. On a different week, participants 
were told to press the button three times at three specified times during the day and to 
press the button once whenever they thought of this time-based task. 
As participants approached the commons, the frequency of intention recall 
increased substantially, especially in the last 30 seconds; when they left the commons 
recall dropped off markedly for a period. However, this pattern occurred only when 
participants successfully remembered to press the badge button three times when inside 
the commons. When they failed to remember, the rate of single-button presses did not 
rise as they approached the commons, but often did go up immediately after exiting the 
room. These results suggest that environmental cues contribute both to successful 
performance and to retrieving an intention after leaving the window of opportunity to 
execute it, but these cues are not sufficient to guarantee performance. 
The rate of intention retrieval also increased when participants were in transition 
locations, such as stairwells or hallways, when task demands were presumably lower. 
This is consistent with K vavilashvili and Fisher's (2007) finding that retrieval of 
intentions was more frequent with less attention-demanding tasks. It may be that when 
ongoing tasks do not completely occupy attention and working memory, random 
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variations in activation allow thoughts of other goals and tasks to emerge. Alternately, 
individuals may develop the habit of using low workload periods to deliberately search 
memory for other things they must accomplish. 
Few laboratory studies have examined how variations in tasks during the 
retention interval might affect prospective memory performance. Hicks, Marsh, and 
Russell (2000) found that prospective memory performance increased significantly when 
breaks occurred in retention-interval tasks, and even more so when those breaks did not 
make task demands at all. Performance was also better when participants switched among 
tasks during this interval. In contrast, Finstad, Bink, McDaniel, & Einstein (2006) found 
the opposite-both breaks and task switching impaired prospective remembering. 
However, in this study the breaks occurred during the ongoing task, when participants 
knew they might encounter prospective memory targets, whereas in the Hicks et al. study 
the breaks occurred during the retention interval, when targets would not be encountered. 
It may be that participants use different strategies for attention allocation for an ongoing 
task combined with a prospective memory task than for the single task during the 
retention interval. These different strategies might affect thinking about and activation of 
the prospective memory task. 
In both the Sellen et al. (1997) study and the K vavilashvili and Fisher (2007) 
study, prospective memory performance was worse on the time-based task than on the 
event-based task, even though frequency of thought about the time-based intention was 
greater. This may retlect participants' recognition that the time-based task is more 
difficult (because they are less likely to encounter environmental cues during the window 
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of opportunity), and an attempt to compensate with rehearsal during the retention 
interval. 
Does the frequency of retrieval of an intention before the window of opportunity 
to execute it affect the probability of successfully remembering to execute the intention 
when the opportunity arrives? These retention-interval recollections might serve to 
increase activation of the intention and might elaborate the original encoding of the 
intention. Alternately, the increased activation might subside before the window of 
opportunity for execution, and encoding might not be the factor limiting successful 
remembering to perform the intention. Unfortunately, little data exist to answer this 
question. Prospective memory performance in the K vavilashvili and Fisher (2007) study 
was at ceiling, and Sellen et al. (1997) did not report analyzing correlation between 
retention-interval recollections with performance. However, K vavilashvili and Fisher did 
report a significant correlation (0.39) between frequency of recollections and the percent 
of intentions fulfilled on time, rather than late. 
Does prospective remembering show decay over time and, if so, does this decay 
resemble the classic decay curve prominent in studies of retrospective memory? 
Surprisingly, only a handful of studies have examined this question, using diverse 
experiment designs, and the results are inconsistent. Stone, Dismukes, & Remington 
(200 I) found no differences in retention intervals of one, three, and five minutes. 
Einstein, Holland, McDaniel, & Guynn (1992) found no difference in prospective 
remembering between 15 minutes and 30 minutes, and Guynn, McDaniel, & Einstein 
(1998) found no difference between four and 20 minute intervals. In contrast, 
Brandimonte and Passolunghi (1994) found prospective remembering declined from zero 
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to three minutes if the retention interval was tilled with a demanding mental task or 
undemanding motor activity, but not with undemanding verbal activity. Hicks, Marshall, 
& Russell (2000) found that prospective remembering actually improved from a 2.5 
minute interval to a 15 minute interval, however this result must be interpreted with 
caution because the ongoing task during the longer interval was not the same as the one 
used with the shorter interval. Holbrook, Nowinski, and Dismukes (2005) found that 
activation of a completed intention (as measured by decreased reaction time on an 
unrelated speeded task) was decreased after a 40 minute delay, compared to a five minute 
delay. 
In a special case of retention, Einstein, McDaniel, Williford, Pagan, and 
Dismukes (2003) examined prospective remembering when participants had to delay 
executing a successfully retrieved intention for a short period (called the delayed-execute 
paradigm). Delays of as little as 5 seconds caused small but significant reduction in 
performance, however performance did not decline further at 15 or 40 seconds. These 
results illustrate that in some situations prospective remembering is quite fragile. 
The studies just cited used laboratory paradigms and short retention intervals. 
Nigro and Cicogna (2000) used a more naturalistic task-remembering to give a message 
to a second experimenter-and found prospective remembering to not differ between 10 
minute, two-day, and two-week intervals. 
Almost certainly these diverse findings reflect differences in methodology, 
especially differences in ongoing tasks during the retention interval that differ in 
cognitive demand, opportunities for rehearsal, and relation between the ongoing task and 
the prospective task. The field would benefit from more systematic study of retention 
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interval, one of several areas of study that could help us elucidate the diverse ways in 
which deferred intentions are stored in memory and retrieved. 
Time-based prospective memory 
In some situations we must remember to perform an intention at a particular 
time-for example, going to an appointment-{)f after a specific interval, for example, 
taking cookies out of the oven after the intended cooking time. Theoretically, time-based 
prospective remembering should hinge on quite different mechanisms than event-based 
remembering, because external cues are not available to trigger retrieval. In reality, 
incidental cues often remind individuals of a time-based intention, as reported by 
Kvavilashvili and Fisher (2007). Also, individuals may deliberately convert a time-based 
task to an event based one, for example, by setting an alarm, creating reminder cues 
likely to be noticed at the appropriate time, or associating the time-based task to an 
event-for example, noting that a planned telephone call at 10 0' clock can be made 
immediately after a class ends (Graf & Grondin, 2006). Nevertheless, it is important to 
explore the mechanisms underlying time-based remembering in the absence of external 
cues. 
Relatively few laboratory studies have examined time-based remembering (see 
Glicksohn and Myslobodsky, 2006, fOf a collection of essays on the topic). Typically, 
participants are given an ongoing task and told that they should also make a separate 
response at periodic intervals (which may vary in duration or be fixed). Participants do 
not have direct access in time information, but can look over their shoulder (Harris and 
Wilkins, 1982) or press a computer button (Einstein, McDaniel, Richardson, Guynn, & 
Cunfer, 1995) to see a clock. Typically, participants increase frequency of clock-checking 
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as the target time approaches, and on trials in which this increase does not occur they are 
less likely to respond at the target time. This pattern of monitoring has been interpreted as 
evidence that participants are using an iterative Test-Wait-Test-Exit strategy in which 
early tests tell them how much longer until a response is needed (Harris, 1984). 
Frequency of monitoring increases as the target time approaches and more precision is 
needed to insure a timely response. This strategy would presumably draw upon internal 
biological processes that allow approximate but not precise estimates of time. 
Arguably, maintaining this sort of monitoring is more demanding of limited 
cognitive resources than relying on target cues to trigger retrieval in event-based 
prospective remembering. In support of this view, older participants, whose working 
memory capacity is typically diminished, do not show a pronounced increase in 
monitoring as the target time approaches and generally perform more poorly in most 
laboratory paradigms than younger participants, particularly if the ongoing task is 
demanding (Einstein et ai, 1995; d' Y derwalle, Bouckaert, & Brunfaut, 2001). 
In contrast with these laboratory findings, older participants often show 
unimpaired or even improved time-based prospective remembering in naturalistic 
paradigms, such as that of K vavilashvili and Fisher (2007). Possible explanations for the 
good performance of older adults in these paradigms are (l) they encounter happenstance 
cues in their home settings that remind them of the time-based intention during the much 
longer retention intervals of these paradigms, (2) they create cues to remind themselves, 
and (3) the daily tasks of older adults are less demanding, allowing more opportunities 
for retrieval. It is also relevant that, in event-based laboratory paradigms in which 
participants are likely to rely on spontaneous (automatic) retrieval rather than engaging in 
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effortful monitoring (e.g., when the target is a single, salient cue), older adults perform as 
well as younger participants (McDaniel, Einstein, & Rendell, 2008). Thus, if older adults 
convert time-based tasks to event-based tasks in everyday situations by using external 
cues they may perform as well as younger adults. 
It is important to note that the intervals used in laboratory studies of prospective 
remembering are quite short, typically only a few minutes, in contrast to the much longer 
intervals in diary studies and everyday experience (Holbrook & Dismukes, in press). It 
seems highly improbable that individuals would maintain a continuous monitoring 
strategy for long intervals when engaging in diverse ongoing tasks, however the 
mechanisms underlying retrieval after long intervals have not been explored in depth. 
K vavilashvili and Fisher (2007) found that the mean number of intention retrievals over 
the seven days of their study formed a U-shaped curve, with a relatively high rate of 
retrieval on the fIrst day, diminishing to a low rate at mid-week and reaching a maximum 
on the day participants were to call the experimenter. This pattern occurred only for 
participants who remembered to make the call at or near the specifIed time; participants 
who were late making the call (all remembcred eventually) did not record an increase in 
retrieval rate on the day to make the call. These results might be explained as follows: As 
the target time approaches, most participants respond to each retrieval by additional 
processing of the retrieved intention, increasing activation and making future retrievals 
more likely, causing the retrieval rate to snowball toward the end. It is also possible that, 
as the target time gets very close, participants shift to a continuous monitoring mode. 
In everyday and workplace settings prospective memory tasks that appear to be 
time-based may in reality be performed as event-based-individuals may rely on 
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environmental cues to prompt them to make a timely response. Setting an alarm clock is a 
common example, though not a strategy that can be applied in many situations. Another 
example is maintaining a daily calendar and developing the habit of checking it 
periodically (this itself is a form of time-based prospective memory) or after completing 
each task. The latter strategy is of course flawed in that, if an ongoing task takes longer 
than expected-hardly a rare occurrence--the calendar may not be checked soon enough 
to remember an appointment. 
Monitoring and concurrent task management 
In many workplace situations, skilled operators must manage multiple tasks 
concurrently, and often this involves performing an ongoing task while periodically 
shifting attention to one or more other tasks to check their state (Wickens & McCarley, 
2008, chapter nine; Loukopoulos et aI., 2009). This is a form of time-based prospective 
memory, and it also involves task switching, but it differs from most task-switching 
experimental paradigms in that the operator is not explicitly cued when to make the 
switch. Also, in most task-switching paradigms, switches are made so frequently that 
participants are not likely to forget to make a switch. (Studies in these paradigms have 
focused mainly on the issue of time cost in sv.itching between tasks, as a way to explore 
cognitive mechanisms involved in switching.) 
In many workplace and everyday situations individuals perform ongoing tasks for 
relatively long periods before switching attention to check the status of other tasks; here 
the danger is of forgetting to switch attention between tasks, thus these situations can be 
said to involve prospective memory. I will focus mainly on examples from aviation, a 
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domain my colleagues and I have studied extensively; however, the issues also apply to 
many other domains, such as medical practice and process control industries. 
Some situations allow operators to develop a consistent pattern of switching 
attention among tasks; for example, pilots develop a consistent pattern of monitoring 
multiple flight instruments, though this pattern may change as a function of flight profile 
and what the pilot wants the aircraft to do at a given time. In these situations, I argue that 
monitoring the various flight instruments merges into a single habitual task with closely 
related subtasks (e.g., monitor attitude indicator, switch gaze to airspeed indicators, back 
to attitude indicator, switch to altimeter, etc); performance of one subtask triggers 
execution of the next subtask. 
Here I want to focus on a different sort of situation in which tasks cannot be 
practiced together in a consistent fashion to proficiency. Consider the situation in which 
the distribution of fuel among an aircraft's fuel tanks has become unbalanced in flight 
and must be rebalanced by running both engines from the tank with more fuel, instead of 
feeding each engine from its own fuel tank, and this process takes some minutes, 
depending on the situation. During this period the pilots are engaged in other tasks3, but 
must periodically monitor the fuel gauges to know when to switch the engines back to 
their respective fuel tanks. This situation resembles that in time-based prospective 
memory experiments, differing mainly in that pilots know only approximately how long 
fuel transfer will take. Pilots report becoming absorbed in ongoing tasks and forgetting to 
monitor fuel balancing adequately (Loukopoulos et aI., 2009). Relevant to this situation is 
) These tasks vary depending on when the fuel imbalance occurs, thus pilots cannot 
practice switching attention between these tasks and monitoring the fuel gauges 
consistently or extensively enough for attention switching to become automatic. 
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the experimental finding that participants in time-based prospective memory studies 
sometimes forget to make the intended response even after having checked the time only 
seconds before (Harris & Wilkins, 1982; McDaniel, Einstein, Stout, & Morgan, 2003). 
Automobile driving involves situations sharing aspects studied in task switching 
and aspects studied in prospective memory. Outside the window visual-motor tasks--
steering, interpreting road signs, reacting to movement of other cars and pedestrians-
must be integrated and are sometimes combined with tasks that move attention inside the 
vehicle: checking instrument displays, tuning the radio, adjusting climate controls, 
talking with a passenger, or talking on a cell phone. Some tasks, such as steering and 
reacting to other cars, are closely related and practiced together consistently enough to 
fuse into a single task, but other tasks are more vulnerable to prospective memory 
failures. Drivers become absorbed in driving and forget to monitor for a planned exit, or 
become absorbed in a cell phone conversation and fail to monitor the visual environment 
frequently enough to respond to unexpected events such as another car swerving across 
lanes. This absorption, termed cognitive tunneling, is amplified when the current ongoing 
task makes high demands on executive functions (Wickens & McCarley, 2008, p. 153). 
Part of the challenge of remembering to switch attention among monitoring tasks 
is that the frequency with which attention must be switched is typically not well defined 
and varies with the current states of the tasks. Consider a first officer who must look 
dovo.TI to revise information in the flight management computer (which might be required 
when the crew receive a revised departure clearance) while the captain is taxiing the 
airplane to the runway. While making data entries, the tlrst officer must continue other 
duties. especially looking up to monitor taxi progress and to guard against errors the 
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captain might make, such as crossing a runway without clearance from ground control. If 
data entry can be quickly accomplished and if no immediate threats exist for the taxi, the 
first officer may devote all attention to completing data entry quickly, otherwise he or she 
must switch attention back and forth, making a few keystrokes, looking up, and then 
returning to data entry. The frequency with which the first officer must shift attention to 
the outside visual environment is not explicitly defined and varies according to what is 
happening outside the aircraft. To the limited extent this sort of attention switching has 
been studied, skilled operators seem able to perform well most of the time, but in high 
workload situations performance can fall apart (Wickens & McCarley, 2008, chapter 
nine; Loukopoulos, et aI., 2009). In particular, if unexpected problems with data entry 
arise, the first officer may unwittingly become absorbed in this task to the neglect of 
monitoring. 
Craik and Bialystok (2006) developed a naturalistic paradigm to study planning 
and task management in older adults that balances the respective advantages and 
disadvantages of laboratory studies and field studies. Participants were given the 
computer-simulated task of cooking breakfast, which involved starting and stopping 
cooking five foods so that they wcre all ready at the same time. An additional task of 
setting the table further increased demands for managing multiple tasks concurrently. 
Dependent measures were how close participants came to cooking each food the correct 
amount of time and how close they came to finish cooking all five foods at the same time. 
This paradigm illustrates the close relationship of time-based prospective memory 
to task switching and concurrent task management. An interesting finding was that, 
although older participants showed the expected performance decrement associated with 
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reduced executive (frontal lobe) functioning during aging, this decrement could be 
prevented by strong environment support that cued participants to the current status of 
each task. 
Currently we lack validated computational models of the mechanisms involved in 
switching attention in time-based prospective memory that would account for 
vulnerability to lapses. Indirectly relevant is the SEEV model Wickens and his colleagues 
developed to describe distribution of attention among visual areas of interest in cockpits 
and other operator control stations (Wickens, McCarley, Alexander, Thomas, Ambinder, 
& Zheng, 2008; Wickens, Goh, Helleberg, Horrey, & Talleur, 2003). In this model, 
attention is distributed by a linear weighted combination of four variables: Salience (S) of 
the area of interest, expectancy (E) that the area will provide information to support 
performance of the current goal, effort (E) required to shift gaze toward the area, and the 
value (V) of performing the goal. The SEEV model does not predict cognitive tunneling 
or time-based prospective memory errors (the two may be closely related), however we 
might draw on it in developing models of prospective memory and also draw upon 
models of task switching. 
For example, the effort component of the model might be expanded to address the 
costs of task switching, such as the difficulty of maintaining two or more goals in 
working memory, the need to disengage from one task while retaining information about 
the status of that task, and the need to re-establish the state of the task to which attention 
is switched (Wickens & McCarley, 2008, pp. 147-150). These variables might also 
contribute to vulnerability to lapses of monitoring concurrent tasks while performing an 
ongoing task. An issue of especial importance is the ability of skilled operators 
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performing ongoing tasks to remember to switch attention to monitor for very low 
probability events that, if they occurred, would have high consequence. For example, in 
light aircraft lacking master caution warning systems, pilots should periodically monitor 
the engine oil pressure and oil temperature gauges, usually placed well to the side of the 
flight displays that provide information necessary to control the aircraft in instrument 
meteorological conditions. Excursions of oil pressure and temperature presage engine 
failure-a very rare event, but one of considerable import in a single-engine aircraft. 
Unfortunately, we have neither experimental data nor theoretical models of how 
operators monitor for low probability, high consequence events. Personal experience 
suggests that operators find it difficult to maintain monitoring in such situations, perhaps 
because human attention is inherently biased toward sources of task-relevant information 
in flux. The issue is compounded because there are no standards for how frequently 
operators should monitor for very low probability, high consequence events. 
Remembering to peiform habitual tasks 
Many tasks in workplace and everyday settings are habitual, in some cases 
performed so frequently and so consistently that execution is largely automatic; in other 
cases performed less frequently but often enough to at least become routine, though less 
automatic. An example of a task that seems to be largely automatic is starting one's car-
a typical procedure might be to sit in the driver's seat, fasten the seat belt, insert the 
ignition key, depress the clutch, turn the ignition key, place the gearshift in forward or 
reverse, and release the clutch while slightly depressing the accelerator. An example of a 
routine procedure is taking a medication at a particular time each day; although the 
sequence of actions may not be as automated as starting a car, they may be performed at a 
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consistent time and place. Clearly the cognitive mechanisms underlying habitual 
performance are quite different from those of remembering to perform an episodic task 
(event-based or time-based), and for this reason some authors do not consider habitual 
tasks to involve prospective memory. However, individuals do forget to perform habitual 
tasks, sometimes with disastrous consequences (Loukopoulos, et aI., 2009), so these 
situations deserve study. 
Most of the tasks pilots report forgetting to perform are habitual or at least 
routine, probably reflecting the fact that much of airline flying is repetitive and explicitly 
prescribed in formal operating procedures. Habitual tasks are certainly a part of the work 
of many professions, such as medical practice, but prospective remembering in any form 
has received little study in professions outside aviation (see Grundgeiger & Sanderson, 
2009, and Dembitzer & Lai, 2003, for a few examples from medicine). 
Few laboratory studies have examined habitual prospective remembering, and 
these have not focused on the mechanisms enabling remembering of habitual tasks. 
Einstein, McDaniel, Smith, and Shaw (1998) gave participants a sequence of II ongoing 
tasks and, as the prospective task, asked them to press a designated key during the last 2 
Y, minutes of each ongoing task. Repetition errors (pressing the key more than once) 
increased with later tasks, especially with older participants and under divided attention. 
This suggests that, as the prospective task became somewhat more habitual, participants 
had trouble remembering if they had performed it on the current occasion, a form of 
source monitoring or output monitoring error (memory of past occasions becomes blurred 
with the most recent occasion). 
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In a similar study, Vedhara et al. (2004) gave elderly patients 20 blocks of 
ongoing task trials in which they were to press the space bar during each block at least 30 
sec after the start of the task. Providing an auditory cue or combined auditory and visual 
cues substantially reduced omission errors but not repetition errors. Also, there was some 
indication of positive correlation of performance in the laboratory prospective memory 
paradigm with patients' adherence to taking their diabetes medication. 
Both Einstein et al. (1998) and Vedhara et al. (2004) termed their work studies of 
habitual prospective memory, but it is unlikely that the number of prospective memory 
trials in these studies was sufficient to establish a strong habit of prospective responding, 
so we are still lacking empirical research on why skilled operators sometimes forget to 
perform elements of highly practiced tasks. 
Taking daily medications falls somewhere between highly practiced tasks and 
episodic tasks; it is routine and repetitive yet is not performed with the frequency and 
consistency required to become highly automatic. Medication adherence is a crucial 
issue, especially among elderly patients, but only a few studies have analyzed the 
cognitive factors involved in this form of prospective remembering (Wilson & Park, 
2008). Park, et al. (1991) studied medication organizers (pill containers with separate 
compartments for each dose) used by arthritis patients and found that only one in three 
over-the-counter organizers appeared to improve adherence. They suggested that 
effective organizers may improve adherence, both by structuring patients' behavior and 
by facilitating their comprehension of the drug regimen. 
Habitual prospective remembering demonstrates repetition errors as well as 
omission errors, however repetition errors may be more a matter of retrospective memory 
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than prospective memory. When a task has been performed consistently many times in a 
largely automatic fashion, little trace of the most recent episode is recorded in declarative 
memory, thus in situations in which the status of the task is not clearly revealed by the 
state of the environment it is difficult for individuals to determine whether they have 
recently performed the task. 
In one sense habitual prospective memory has been studied extensively, though 
not under that rubric. Considerable experimental evidence indicates that, with extensive 
practice of tasks, action schemata develop, stored as procedural memory (Norman & 
Shallice, 1986; Wood & Neal, 2007). These schemata are activated (retrieved) by 
associated environment cues and fire off sequential steps of the task automatically. 
Execution of each step is triggered by performance of the preceding step. 
This theoretical account of action schema may help explain why individuals 
sometimes forget to perform elements of habitual tasks. Forgetting to perform habitual 
task elements is often associated with interruptions and with circumstances that force 
pilots to perform elements out of the normal sequence or to defer an element to a later 
time (Nowinski, Holbrook, & Dismukes, 2003; Loukopoulos et aI., 2009). These 
circumstances removed normal environmental cues and broke the chain of triggering of 
sequential task elements. 
However, these observations came from ethnographic study and analysis of incident and 
accident reports; controlled studies are needed to verifY these impressions and to 
elucidate underlying mechanisms. 
Substituting atypical actions/or habitual behaviors 
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Most of us have had the experience of going into a room intending to perform 
some action-for example, going into the bathroom to look for a comb-and, distracted 
by rumination, performing a habitual task instead of the intended task-for example, 
brushing our teeth. Reason (1990, pp68-71) describes numerous examples of such habit 
intrusion. It seems likely that when we start out to perform a task similar in initial steps to 
a habitual task it is easy for our minds to wander and fail to exercise the executive control 
necessary to prevent a habitual action schema from capturing our actions. In workplace 
settings in which task steps are performed repetitively in a fixed sequence habit intrusion 
can be an insidious threat. Also, Betsch, Haberstroh, Molter, and Glockner (2004) found 
(in a laboratory paradigm) that inadvertently reverting to a routine action rather than 
substituting an intended alternative action increased substantially under time pressure to 
perform ongoing tasks. 
Substituting atypical actions for habitual behaviors has received little attention 
from the prospective memory research community, perhaps because these tasks may 
seem to involve attention and action more than memory. However, these tasks have the 
essential aspect of requiring the individual to remember to perform a deferred intention 
(substituting a atypical action for a habitual one) without explicit prompting. Stone, 
Dismukes, and Remington (2001) designed a paradigm mimicking air traffic control in 
which participants had to advance several aircraft in a display along a routine (default) 
path, but occasionally had to remember to direct one aircraft to a non-routine location. 
Remembering to execute the deferred intention to act against habit was impaired by high 
workload. 
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K vavilashvili (1998) developed a novel paradigm for other purposes that could be 
used to study this topic.4 In this paradigm participants were given text to read aloud and 
told to substitute a synonym for a given word whenever it was encountered (in this study 
detective was substituted for prefect. 5 Pronouncing familiar words while reading aloud is 
practiced to such a degree that it is largely automatic, thus participants had to remember 
without prompting to inhibit the habitual response to the word prefect and substitute the 
word detective. Failing to substitute words could be regarded as a case of habit intrusion. 
One interesting finding of this study was a change in prospective memory failures 
from the first 10 trials to the last 10 trials. One might expect that performance would 
improve over the course of the experiment as participants gained experience in inhibiting 
the habitual response and substituting the atypical response. Surprisingly, the opposite 
occurred: performance declined during the course of the experiment. Apparently 
participants became more absorbed in the plot of the story and thus more vulnerable to 
habit capiture. 
As an aside, absorption in an ongoing task is a factor that may be of considerable 
importance in prospective remembering. Absorption (which might also be called 
"engagement" or "cognitive tunneling") has been studied to some extent in the context of 
multitasking (Wickens & McCarley, 2008, pi 53), but it has not been studied in the 
context of prospective memory, perhaps because of the difficulty of creating objective 
measures. Conceivably, prospective memory performance in the Kvavilashvili paradigm 
4 The paradigm was designed to address methodological issues with the McDaniel-
Einstein paradigm, in which participants are typically not told that the primary purpose of 
the study is prospective remembering and in which performance of individual 
rartic!p.ants isofie? near ceiling or flo~r. .. 
. Participants In thiS study were Georgians and the text was In Georgian. 
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might provide such a measure; unfortunately, later research has not followed up on this 
promising paradigm. 
Interruptions 
Work in today' s world is rift with interruptions, disrupting performance and 
causing stress (Lohr, 2007; Monk, Boehm-Davis, & Trafton, 2004). Dodhia and 
Dismukes (2009) argue that interruptions intrinsically create prospective memory tasks-
one must remember to resume the interrupted task after the interruption ends. This may 
seem easy if only the two tasks exist and if environmental cues clearly signal that the 
interrupted task remains. This is the situation of most experimental studies of 
interruptions, which focus on the delay in resuming the interrupted task, similar to task 
switching paradigms (Monk et aI., 2004; Trafton, Altmann, Brock, & Mintz, 2003). 
However in many real-world situations, interruptions can be prolonged, the suspended 
state of the interrupted task is not saliently signaled, and new task demands present 
themselves. Another problem may also occur when the interrupted task is habitual: The 
individual may confuse the state of the interrupted task with completion on previous 
occasions or, remembering that the action schema was initiated, assume that it was 
completed (both are forms of source memory confusion). Procedural memory, enabling 
execution of habitual tasks, generally does not leave a reliable episodic memory of 
individual instances of execution. 
Interruptions are frequent in the medical field (Chisholm, Collison, Nelson, & 
Cordell. 2000; Ebright, Patterson, Chalko, & Render, 2003; Grundgeiger & Sanderson, 
2008), but few empirical studies have examined the contribution of interruptions to 
medical error. Grundgeiger, Liu, Sanderson, Jenkins, and Leane ( 2008) used an 
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interruption event in an anesthesiology simulation involving 12 participants. The habitual 
prospective memory task was to check that a nurse had verified that a unit of blood to be 
transfused was the correct type; participants were given an interrupting task at a time they 
would normally have observed the actions of the nurse setting up the transfusion. The 
sample size was too small for statistical analysis, but the results suggest that participants 
who avoided letting the interruption divert their attention were less likely to forget the 
blood type check or to make it belatedly. This type of study, using realistic simulations to 
study prospective memory performance of skilled participants, holds considerable 
promise. 
Dodhia and Dismukes (2009) hypothesized that individuals forget to resume 
interrupted tasks for three reasons: (1) Interruptions often abruptly divert attention, which 
may prevent adequate encoding of an intention to resume the interrupted task and 
forming an implementation plan, (2) new task demands after an interruption's end reduce 
the opportunity to interpret cues that might remind the individual of the interrupted task, 
and (3) the transition after an interruption to new ongoing task demands is not distinctive 
because it is defined conceptually, rather than by a single perceptual cue. Participants 
were given a somewhat naturalistic (at least for college students!) ongoing task-
answering a series of multiple-choice questions---and were told that when interrupted 
they should return to the interrupted task. However the computer presented a new set of 
questions immediately after the interruption ended, and participants had to remember 
without prompting to go back to the interrupted question before proceeding with the new 
set of questions. Three manipUlations improved remembering to resume interrupted 
questions significantly: providing a reminder at the beginning of the interruption, 
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providing a pause at the beginning of the interruption, and explicitly signaling the end of 
the interruption. The authors interpret these results as supporting their hypotheses. 
The Effects of Age on Prospective Remembering 
Researchers have explored prospective remembering in older adults (McDaniel, 
Einstein, & Rendell, 2008; Phillips, Henry, & Martin, 2008; Maylor, 2008) , children 
(Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; Kerns, 2000; Kvavilashvili, Kyle, & Messer, 2008) and 
several clinical populations (Kliegel, Jager, Altgassen, & Shurn, 2008; Thone-Otto & 
Walther, 2008; Kerns & Price, 2001). I will not review the research on these special 
popUlations (the references just cited provide good overviews), but will comment briefly 
on what is being learned from studies with older adults. Much of the early funding for 
prospective memory came from the U.S. National Institute of Aging and comparable 
agencies in other countries because failures in prospective remembering greatly affect the 
ability of older adults to function independently. Also, researchers have found that aging 
provides a natural manipulation allowing exploration of the cognitive mechanisms of 
prospective memory. Many studies have shown that executive functioning, working 
memory, and attention functions decline in the elderly; thus comparing older participants 
prospective memory performance with that of younger participants can shed light on the 
roles of specific cognitive processes. 
Early studies of prospective remembering in older adults revealed a paradox: 
Older participants performed more poorly than younger participants in many laboratory 
studies but not in many others. And in studies in naturalistic settings older participants 
generally perform as well as younger participants--sometimes even better--even though 
complaining about their memory. McDaniel and Einstein (2000) suggested a resolution of 
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the paradox: Older participants do as well as younger ones in studies using focal cues, for 
which remembering is argued to be largely automatic; older participants do much worse 
when non-focal cues are used, making greater demands on executive function, which 
declines with age. In their own daily environment, some-certainly not all-older adults 
may benefit from having less demanding ongoing tasks and from incidental reminders in 
their environment, and may be more likely to employ strategies to bolster prospective 
remembering. 
Helping elderly adults remember to perform daily tasks, such as keeping 
appointments and taking medicines, is crucial to enable them maintain independent 
living. Some applied research has been directed to this concern, and it is a topic to which 
the human factors community has much to contribute (Charness, 2008). In particular, we 
should draw upon ethnographic studies (Roth & Patterson, 2004) to create detailed 
descriptions of the range of prospective memory tasks of the elderly and the context in 
which those tasks must be performed-the living environment and ongoing tasks. With 
these descriptions and with knowledge of older adults' cognitive, perceptual, and 
physical capabilities, human factors practitioners can design prospective memory aids 
that are practical and effective. 
So, What is Prospective Memory, Really? 
Although well-controlled laboratory studies are essential to understanding 
prospective remembering, we should be cautious in extrapolating findings from these 
studies because experimental paradigms create conditions not always found in diverse 
real-world situations. The instructions given participants may lead to more explicit 
encoding than occurs in some natural situations, and target cues are well defined and 
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fairly simple, whereas in everyday situations the conditions for performing a deferred 
intention may be ill-defined or complex. In everyday settings, incidental cues may remind 
individuals before, during, or after the time or situation in which they intend to perform a 
deferred intention. Repeated trials, temporal spacing of trials, short retention intervals, 
the nature of the ongoing task, and requiring participants to keep in mind as many as six 
target cues probably affect the interplay of cognitive processes involved in managing the 
combination of a prospective task with an ongoing task, and these factors may sometimes 
lead participants to use strategies impractical in everyday life. 
Nevertheless, the research reviewed here, though far from providing a complete 
story, is a good foundation for understanding prospective remembering. Clearly, it is not 
a unitary cognitive process, and memory processes are only part of the story. Planning, 
attention, task switching, and task management are also central players. This is not 
surprising, given that prospective memory is defined not in cognitive terms but as a 
practical task: To remember to perform a planned action without prompting at a later 
time, when we will be occupied with other tasks. How prospective remembering is 
accomplished and how different cognitive processes come into play are a function of the 
nature and perceived importance of the intention, whether the individual thinks he or she 
might forget to perform the intended action, strategies the individual may use to support 
remembering, how the intention is encoded, the length of the retention interval, and the 
character of ongoing tasks--especially how those tasks direct attention and cause 
environmental information to be processed. Researchers should beware of assuming that 
results obtained in a single experimental paradigm capture the essential nature of 
prospective remembering. The mUlti-process theory is a step toward acknowledging the 
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flexibility and diversity of prospective remembering, but even it addresses only some 
aspects. 
One of the early questions in prospective memory research was whether 
prospective remembering involves specialized functions distinct from those found in the 
broader field of cognition (Brandimonte et a!., 1996). Although our understanding of 
prospective memory is still incomplete, considerable progress has been made by framing 
accounts in terms of already known cognitive processes (not limited to memory); as yet it 
has not been necessary to posit any unique process for prospective memory. Even the 
intention superiority effect can be described in terms of existing concepts, such as 
activation and inhibition. But, clearly, prospective remembering is a heterogeneous 
phenomenon, and the challenge is to uncover how multiple cognitive processes come into 
play in specific situations. 
People sometimes assume that forgetting to perform an important task-
celebrating a spouse's birthday, removing an instrument before closing a surgical 
incision, or setting flaps for takeoff-reveals a lack of concern, vigilance, or skill on the 
part of the person who forgets. But our research with skilled airline pilots reveals that 
even the most skilled of operators are vulnerable to occasional lapses, even when the 
lapse threatens their own lives (Loukopoulos et a!., 2009). Although research on 
prospective memory is far from complete, it is now clear that a cognitive account is far 
more appropriate and useful than moral explanations. 
To summarize, the research to date suggests four central aspects of prospective 
remembering: (I) It can be accounted for in terms of general cognitive mechanisms rather 
than requiring a unique underlying process, (2) the way these cognitive mechanisms 
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come into play varies substantially with the specific character of the prospective task, 
ongoing tasks, environmental conditions, and the individual, (3) cueing (external or 
generated by the individual's stream of thought) is central to retrieval of intentions, and 
(4) encoding is also crucial, though less studied than cueing. 
Measures to Improve Prospective Remembering 
Several authors have suggested ways individuals can reduce vulnerability to 
forgetting to perform deferred intentions (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007, pp. 194-205; 
Dismukes, 2008; Loukopoulos et aI., 2009, chapter six; Wilson & Park, 2008; Herrmann, 
Raybeck, & Gruneberg, 2002, pp. 151-160). For the most part these suggestions are 
reasonable extrapolations from studies of how prospective memory works in the 
laboratory and are sensible, but only a few studies have empirically examined the 
effectiveness of countermeasures and the conditions that determine effectiveness. Also, it 
is disconcerting to a researcher to realize that some of these suggestions are already 
employed, though not consistently, by many lay people who have not read the 
prospective memory literature (Walker & Andrews, 2001). 
I suggest that the first step toward improving prospective remembering is 
education. People often underestimate vulnerability to forgetting, perhaps because 
intentions typically involve simple, familiar actions. They may mistakenly assume that 
intended actions of profound importance (remembering the sleeping infant in the back of 
the car) will not be forgotten, and they may assume that skill and conscientiousness are 
adequate safeguards in such situations. But numerous reports reveal that even the most 
conscientious of skilled operators sometimes forget intended tasks of great importance. 
My colleagues and I have read many incident reports from pilots, which I generalize as: 
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"I have been an airline captain for many years and have never before had an incident like 
this. My peers all regard me as an able pilot and a stickler for following procedures 
exactly. I cannot understand why I forgot to call for flaps to be set, but I will be ever 
more vigilant against making this error again". 
Understanding that we are all vulnerable to forgetting intentions is only the ftrst 
step of education. People need to know the circumstances in which they are most 
vulnerable to forgetting and to know what safeguards might be used in particular 
situations. 
McDaniel and Einstein, (2007, pp. 194-205) start their suggestions for improving 
prospective remembering with a simple recommendation. If an intention is very 
important, if at all possible, do not delay performing it. Laboratory studies suggest that, 
as soon as attention turns to other tasks, individuals become vulnerable to forgetting to 
perform an intention, sometimes in only a few seconds (Einstein, McDaniel, Williford, 
Pagan, & Dismukes, 2003; McDaniel, Einstein, Stout, & Morgan, 2003). But of course in 
many situations executing an intention when it is formed is simply not possible. 
Creating reminder cues can be one of the most powerful prospective memory 
tools. Cues that are distinctive, salient, and closely associated with the intention are 
generally the most effective, however no cue is effective if the task being performed 
when retrieval is needed does not direct attention to that cue and cause it to be processed. 
Thus we must think carefully about what we will likely be doing during the window of 
opportunity for performing the deferred intention. Best of all are cues that physically 
impede us from continuing an ongoing task during the window of opportunity. Pilots who 
must suspend execution of a checklist sometimes put the checklist between the throttle 
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levers, which prevents them from advancing the throttles for takeoff without seeing the 
checklist. 
Cues sometimes fail for unexpected reasons. A friend reported putting a book bag 
she needed to take to work the next morning against the door she normally takes to her 
car, but on the morning in question happened to exit from another door and forgot the 
book bag. Some years ago the computer support people in my organization asked us to 
leave our computers running on Tuesdays so they could back them up. Being well aware 
of my absent-mindedness I stuck a post-it note reminder on the edge of my computer 
screen. But by the time Tuesday came around I had become so habituated to the post-it 
that I turned the computer off as usuaL 
Implementation plarming can also be a powerful tool. When you form an 
intention, give some thought to what you are likely to be doing when you expect to 
perform the intention. Spend some time imagining yourself performing the intention in 
conjunetion with specific ongoing activities, identifY environmental cues associated with 
those activities, and form a mental association between those cues and the intention. 
Recognize situations likely to undermine prospective remembering. Ongoing 
tasks that make heavy cognitive demands increase vulnerability, and anecdotal accounts 
suggest that deeply engaging tasks may do the same. We may fail to notice our freeway 
exit either when driving conditions are severely demanding or when they are so 
undemanding we drift into mental reverie. Habits can protect or undermine prospective 
remembering. Many automobiles can be locked on exiting either with a button on the 
driver's armrest or a key fob. Several times after turning off the ignition I have either put 
my ignition key down or dropped it without noticing while gathering up items to take into 
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the house and then locked the car with the armrest button, discovering that the key was 
locked in the car only after I shut the door. Now I have developed the habit of always 
using the fob, never the armrest button, to lock the car. 
Remembering to perform repeated tasks, such as taking daily medications, can be 
bolstered by linking the task consistently to other tasks, such as brushing your teeth, 
already strongly established as habits. 
Simple mnemonic techniques can sometimes be helpful. Many of us have had the 
experience of going to a store for several items and forgetting to buy one of them. 
Usually this is not a retrospective memory failure, because generally we can recall the 
items if prompted. Simply counting the number of items to buy when planning the visit 
can aid prospective memory in this situation by allowing us to count the number of items 
bought and searching memory if the count is short. This, of course, creates a new 
prospective memory task-remembering to count items purchased-but this can be 
established as a habit. 
Simple devices, such as pill organizers, can also improve prospective 
remembering in certain situations, however careful analysis is required to identifY the 
features that make them effective (Park, et aI., 1991). Pill organizers guard against both 
errors of omission and errors of commission by providing an unambiguous indication of 
whether pills have been taken at each intended time. However, organizers will work only 
if they are placed where the user will encounter them when needed. (An alternate 
approach is to equip the organizer with an alarm.) Consumers may want to evaluate 
potential household devices for teatures that affect prospective remembering, such as 
automatic shutoff switches for teapots. 
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Many lay people on their own initiative use various prospective memory aids 
(Walker & Andrews, 2001). Personal digital assistants (PDAs) are interesting tools, in 
that they combine features of several tradition memory aids. PDAs have been shovvn to 
improve prospective remembering in everyday situations, but they have drawbacks: They 
sometimes fail; they can be cwnbersome to use, especially for the elderly, and many 
commercial products require substantial effort to learn to use (Herrmann & Petro, 1990; 
Herrmann, Yoder, Wells, & Raybeck, 1996). Low-tech aids, such as post-it notes and 
appointment calendars, still have value! 
Interruptions challenge us to remember to reswne the interrupted task. The limited 
research on this issue suggests we should pause before addressing an interruption to form 
an implementation plan for returning to the interrupted task when it becomes possible. 
Performance of habitual tasks is normally quite reliable and does not require special 
attention, but becomes far less reliable when task elements must be performed out of 
order and when the external cues that normally trigger initiation ofthe task are for some 
reason absent. The best advice in these situations is to treat them as episodic prospective 
memory situations and to employ the strategies just discussed. 
Time-based prospective remembering poses special challenges, in part because 
cueing is limited. One technique is, whenever possible, to convert the time-based 
intention into an event-based intention by identifYing cues or linking the intention to 
activities you will likely be performing at the intended time. For longer retention intervals 
it may be useful to take advantage of spontaneous retrievals during the interval to 
rehearse and elaborate links between the intention and potential cues. 
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Little if any research provides support for prospective remembering when 
individuals must switch attention repeatedly among two or more tasks. However one 
possibility comes from studies showing that people find it easier to switch attention if the 
switch is made after completing a subtask rather than in the middle of a subtask-
presumably this reduces the difficulty of reinstating the status of resumed tasks. Thus, 
when encountering situations in which multiple tasks must be managed concurrently, it 
may be useful to consider how long you can dwell on each task and plan to perform an 
appropriate number of steps in that task before switching to another task. 
In some work environments organizational safeguards have evolved to guard 
against forgetting to perform crucial actions. In aviation, checklists and alerting systems 
are used extensively. Itemized checklists are integrated into the flow of operating 
procedures, and undoubtedly save many lives. However, although a valuable safeguard 
against prospective memory errors, checklists are themselves vulnerable to these errors--
for example, pilots have forgotten to resume interrupted checklists (Loukopoulos et aI, 
2009). Warning systems alert pilots to forgotten tasks; for example, the ground proximity 
warning system of modern airliners verbally annunciates "gear" if pilots have failed to 
lower the landing gear before landing. Perhaps the next generation of aircraft will have 
intelligent systems that monitor aircraft state and model crew intentions to provide 
reminders and warnings closely tuned to diverse situations. However designing any 
system to support prospective remembering should involve a collaboration of designers, 
domain experts (in this case, pilots) and human factors experts to insure that the system 
addresses prospective memory vulnerabilities specific to the situation and that the system 
does not introduce latent error modes. 
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Formal procedures can protect against prospective memory failures, but if poorly 
designed can exacerbate vulnerability to these failures (Degani & Wiener, 1993; 
Loukopoulos et aI., 2009; Burian, 2006). Checklists should be initiated at relatively low 
workload periods, and, whenever possible, critical tasks should be anchored to specific 
and salient events. For example, in aviation it is better to set flaps to takeoff position 
directly after engine start rather than while the aircraft is taxiing to the runway. 
Medical error causes tens of thousands of deaths every year in the U.S. alone 
(Bogner, 1994; 10M, 2000). Although few studies have addressed prospective memory 
errors in medicine, these errors probably playa significant role (Gawande, Studdert, 
Orav, Brennan, & Zinner, 2003; Dembitzer & Lai, 2003). In recent years, leaders in the 
medical community have been working to adapt safety procedures from aviation, such as 
checklists, to medical practice. Two barriers have been encountered. One is that medical 
practice is less standardized than aviation operations. The other barrier is cultural: Some 
practitioners regard using memory aids as an admission of lack of professional skill 
(Hales & Pronovost, 2006). Developing effective and practical prospective memory aids 
in medicine or any other domain requires carefully analysis of the prospective memory 
and ongoing task demands of each specific operational situation, and a good place to start 
this analysis is with ethnographic studies (Roth & Patterson, 2004; also see the next 
section of this chapter). 
A Research Agenda 
Basic research in prospective memory is now a thriving activity on strong 
theoretical footing, and scientists in this area have clear ideas of research issues 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2007; Kliegel et aI., 2008). Much could be gained by extending 
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research on event-based prospective remembering to examine other forms, especially the 
several forms of time-based prospective remembering, habitual prospective memory 
tasks, and interruptions. Underlying these other forms are both basic and applied research 
issues. For example, we have very little understanding of how people switch attention 
among unrelated tasks in the absence of explicit cueing when the interval between task 
switches is too long to support active maintenance in working memory. 
We also need theoretical models of how goals for a suspended task are maintained 
while elements of an unrelated task are being performed. The cognitive architecture 
ACT-R originally postulated that goals have a privileged status not requiring source 
activation to be maintained and included the notion of a goal stack in which sub-goals are 
popped off as completed, triggering the next sub-goal (Anderson and Lebierre, 1998). 
More recently, however, Anderson and Douglass (2001) concluded that goals exist in the 
same form as other memories. We need computational models of prospective 
remembering couched from this more recent perspective and addressing the interplay of 
the goals and sub-goals of prospective and ongoing tasks. Several computational models 
have been proposed for task switching (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008) and multitasking 
(e.g., Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008; Meyer & Kieras, 1997); perhaps these models could be 
adapted to account for switching from an ongoing task to a prospective task, in which the 
switching interval is considerably longer than in most task switching studies. At a more 
applied level, perhaps the framework of situated cognition (Kirlik, 2006) could be used to 
model how operators monitor the status of concurrent tasks requiring prospective 
remembering. 
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In all forms of prospective memory we need to go beyond memory functions and 
examine the roles of planning, such as in forming implementation intentions, and 
attention, especially in managing concurrent tasks. 
Another suggestion is to resist the temptation to generalize too broadly from one 
experimental paradigm. Research to date clearly shows that results vary substantially 
with characteristics such as the nature and number of target cues, length of the retention 
period, character and number of ongoing tasks, the relative importance of the prospective 
and ongoing tasks, and differences among individuals. Almost certainly this reflects 
differences in cognitive processing as a function of strategies individuals use in specific 
situations (consciously or unconsciously). This is hardly surprising, given that humans 
are exquisitely adaptive and tend to use strategies that minimize effort while satisficing 
among multiple goals 
Although many studies address the issue of whether prospective remembering 
requires limited cognitive resources (attention and working memory), little research has 
explored what strategies individuals use in to bolster remembering and what cognitive 
processes underlie those strategies (but see Guynn, 2008, for an account of how 
monitoring may be accomplished). Einstein and McDaniel (2008) speculated that 
individuals may be able to regulate their threshold for noticing cues relevant to deferred 
intentions. If this is true, it might allow individuals to focus intently on an ongoing task to 
the exclusion of thoughts of other tasks or, alternately, to broaden awareness and increase 
sensitivity to concerns beyond the ongoing task. We need research paradigms to explore 
this sort of possibility and the various strategies that might be used to support prospective 
remembering in diverse situations. 
59 
Remembrance of Things Future 
60 
To address both theoretical and applied issues we need to thoroughly understand 
the full range of everyday and workplace situations that create prospective memory 
demands. Ethnographic observations, diary studies, questionnaires, and realistic 
simulations of real-world scenarios are valuable tools for this, as well as paradigms such 
as that of Sellen et al. (1997) that provide objective data in actual workplace settings. 
These tools of course lack the power of well-controlled laboratory paradigms, but they 
are necessary to identify the phenomena that must be addressed in laboratory studies. 
Research on human performance is most powerful when reductionistic approaches are 
combined with observations of integrated performance in the actual environment (or 
realistic simulations of that environment). For example, observations that pilots 
sometimes forget to resume interrupted tasks in the cockpit led to experimental study of 
prospective memory tasks created by interruptions (Dodhia & Dismukes, 2009). 
Also, existing laboratory studies have failed to capture the full range of conditions 
that individuals use to define the window of opportunity for executing an intention. 
Consider a typical laboratory study in which the target cue is the word cat, occurring 
occasionally in a series of words in an ongoing task, such as pleasantness rating. This 
simple target cue, when presented, provides a clearly defined opportunity to execute the 
intention. Contrast this with an everyday situation in which you intend to call a colleague 
shortly after arriving at your office the next morning. The "event", arriving at your office, 
is characterized by multiple elements rather than any single cuc--recognizing, unlocking, 
and opening the door to your office; putting down your briefCase; sitting at your chair, 
etc-which unfurl over time and which you may not be thinking of as "arriving at the 
office", since this activity can be performed largely automatically. In visual attention 
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studies, targets defined by conjunction oftwo variables(e.g., red X's) require much more 
effort to detect in a field of distractors than targets varying on a single dimension (e.g., all 
red letters in a field of differently-colored letters) (Triesman & Gelade, 1980). By 
analogy, prospective remembering might be improved by selecting simple discrete cues 
to define when to perform an intention rather than situations such as "arriving at the 
office", defined by conjunction of several factors. This possibility, however, has not been 
directly studied. 
By their nature, laboratory paradigms establish participants' intentions through 
instructions designed to minimize performance variations other than through explicit 
manipulations. We do not know to what extent self-generated intentions, formed in the 
context of an individual's other goals, habits, and preferences, differ from intentions 
given by an experimenter. Conceivably we might find a self-generation effect comparable 
to that observed in retrospective memory, in which individuals better remember 
information if they generate it themselves rather than receiving it passively (Slamecke & 
Graf, 1978). We do know that the laboratory enviromnent both strips away some aspects 
of the natural world and sometimes creates conditions not found outside the lab. A 
participant in a prospective memory experiment has only the tasks given by the 
experimenter: perform the ongoing task and execute the prospective response when a 
target cue is encountered. (Typically the prospective memory task is presented as a 
secondary or incidental task; this way of couching instruction affects performance, as 
K vavilashvili' s 1998 data reveal.) The experiment instructions may create and the 
laboratory environment may help maintain an association between the ongoing task and 
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the delayed intention not often occurring in real-world situations. Thus we need 
paradigms to bridge between real-world situations and existing laboratory studies. 
In addition to possible differences between self-generated intentions and typical 
laboratory instructions, we need to consider that individuals integrate their own intentions 
into their larger set of goals and manage these dynamically, shifting priorities in response 
to new demands and opportunities. For example, in a study aimed at ecological validity, 
Marsh, Hicks, and Landau (1998) had participants record planned activities at the 
beginning of a week's period and track execution of those activities. Among the findings 
were that participants reprioritized intentions during the week and were likely to fulfill 
intentions for prearranged appointments and intentions involving commitments to other 
people, but were less successful in fulfilling intentions to arrange appointments, to take or 
to return things, and similar activities. The study, which also used laboratory tests of 
retrospective memory and attention, revealed that the participants had accurate meta-
cognitive understanding of their abilities and adapted appropriate compensatory 
strategies. This study demonstrates the value of paradigms that bridge between well-
controlled laboratory studies and ecologically valid studies of how people carry out 
intentions in their daily lives. 
Laboratory studies rarely require participants to retain deferred intentions more 
than an hour, yet in the real world we must sometimes remember intentions formed 
weeks or even months earlier. The mechanisms of retention and retrieval may differ 
substantially as a function of retention interval. For example, in laboratory studies, 
intentions may be maintained in working memory to some degree by association with the 
ongoing task and with the experimental context (this association would provide 
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activation), but this is unlikely for long intervals filled with diverse ongoing tasks. In 
contrast to most experimental studies, in everyday situations individuals do not always 
know what task they will be performing when the opportunity to perform a deferred 
intention arises. 
Also, laboratory studies usually present target cues at least several times, but few 
studies have examined how one retrieval (or failure to retrieve) might affect the 
probability of a later retrieval of an intention (but see Ellis & Milne, 1996, and McNerney 
& West, 2007, for exceptions). Everyday intentions usually involve fairly broad windows 
of opportunity for execution rather than the few seconds a participant in an experiment 
has to respond to a target cue. For example, if you intend to give a message to a friend the 
next time you see him, you have the full length of the encounter to remember your 
intention. The implications of these differences between laboratory and everyday 
situations have seldom been explored. 
The suggestions in the previous section for enhancing prospective remembering 
are sensible and derive from experimental research, but little applied research has been 
conducted to examine how well these suggestions work in diverse real-world situations or 
to determine what factors influence effectiveness. Research analogous to that of Park et 
ai. (1991) on effectiveness of pill organizers is especially needed for all workplace and 
everyday settings in which prospective memory failures can have dire consequences. 
Electronic devices, such as PDAs, can be useful memory aids, but so far their design 
requires better human factors analysis and engineering (Herrmann et aI., 1996). As an 
example of this type of human factors analysis, Vortac, Edwards, and Manning (1995) 
studied air traffic controllers' use of flight data strips to remind themselves of pending 
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actions and explored how switching to visual displays that could not be manipulated 
might affect prospective remembering. Organizations that do adopt measures to protect 
prospective remembering of critical tasks would do well to collect before and after data 
for interventions. (Organizations often fail to actually test the expected effect of 
interventions. ) 
Prospective memory is by its nature an important issue in human factors, and the 
human factors community is well constituted to contribute to understanding of 
prospective remembering and to develop practical ways of enhancing this crucial aspect 
of human performance. Prospective remembering is the product of many cognitive and 
social functions, the individual's experience and goals, interplay with multiple ongoing 
tasks, and the environmental context; thus our understanding of it would benefit greatly 
from the trans-disciplinary approach of human factors. 
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